The Extended Importance of the Social Creation of Value in Evolutionary Processes by Bown, Oliver
The Extended Importance of the Social Creation of Value
in Evolutionary Processes: A Proposed Model
Oliver Bown1
Abstract. In this paper I propose that the social creation of value
is an important factor in the theoretical study of creativity, not only
in cultural evolutionary processes but in the genetic evolution of spe-
cific creative domains, with particular attention to music. I consider
the possibility that music emerged in an autopoietic manner from the
basic conditions of the social creation of value and consider some of
the properties of a model built on this perspective. Within this context
I consider two hypothetical processes that could be tested through
computer simulation; that novelty seeking behaviour leads to the evo-
lution of increasing perceptual complexity, and that novelty seeking
behaviour and the cultural clustering of styles stably reinforce each
other.
1 Introduction
In many cases of human behaviour, the benefits gained by individ-
uals for creative acts are generated entirely through social action.
In other words, the artefacts resulting from these acts have no value
other than that offered by other individuals. In this paper I consider
the importance of this fact to the study of creativity from the per-
spective of the genetic evolution of innate human behavioural traits.
I consider the possibility that the creation of social value played a
significant role in the emergence of genetic aspects of human cre-
ative domains and propose a model for the evolutionary process that
drove this emergence in the case of music. The focus of this work
is less concerned with mechanisms relevant to individual creativity
than with the process of evolution associated with creative domains;
social contexts which can be seen as possible focal points for further
evolution towards what we call creative ability.
Since at least the days of Darwin, evolutionary theory has been
concerned with the economics of organic structure and behaviour.
From an evolutionary perspective, creativity can be seen as the ability
to define new possibilities (artefacts, concepts, behaviours) that are
beneficial to the creator. If I can manipulate a piece of wood or stone
to make a useful tool then my chances of survival are greater than if
I didn’t have that tool: individual creativity is functional. A sensible
evolutionary approach to creativity therefore lies in understanding
the kinds of cognitive developments that would grant individuals a
better command of their environmental niches.
In the emerging story of human evolution, there is another impor-
tant factor the explanation of certain particular human intellectual
abilities: the complex demands of social life under the increasing
external pressure to live in larger groups. Theories of Machiavellian
intelligence [11, 12, 24] propose that human intelligence increased in
a positive feedback cycle of according to a cognitive capacity known
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as theory of mind (ToM); the ability to infer mental states in others
and subsequently predict their behaviour. ToM informs individuals in
making decisions about possible alliances, which can dramatically
affect their physical survival and sexual success. According to this
theory, intraspecies competition is as much a driver for evolution as
adaptation to an external environment, and we should also expect to
see the potential adaptive advantages of creativity in this social con-
text.
However, looking more closely into the dynamics of social life, it
may not only be ToM that evolves under these circumstances. There
are many factors that influence social success in modern humans and
an individual who is poor at ToM may still improve their ultimate
physical and reproductive success by, in some other way, influencing
those around them so as to gain favour. In modern Western society
this is particularly apparent in the set of activities that we classify as
artistic, such as drawing, sculpting, acting and music-making. These
activities typify the social creation of value; the artefacts resulting
from these acts have no value other than that offered by other in-
dividuals. Creativity is evidently a valuable tool in these contexts
then; a creative individual can find ways to ‘extract’ more value from
their neighbours and raise their social success. This is the area of
behaviour that I am concerned with in this paper.
A popular explanation for the existence of these ‘artistic’ activi-
ties in human behaviour, or what Dissanayake [9] generalises cross-
culturally as the act of making special, is that it creates strong social
bonds within communities, that increase the overall fitness of these
communities under exactly the same pressures proposed in theories
of Machiavellian intelligence; because large cohesive societies are
mutually beneficial. However, by comparison with notions of coevo-
lution and positive feedback in other areas of evolutionary theory,
it is possible that the social creation of value bestowed on individ-
uals (rather than the fitness that emerges from a well-unified social
group) is sufficient to explain the emergence of such behaviours in a
population.
Such domains also exhibit a value system which is constantly
shifting; creative individuals achieve success by finding novel arte-
facts of value, and as these artefacts are introduced, new requirements
emerge for success in future generations. Individual value judge-
ments shift according to a history of experience. It may be that this
view is tinted by a degree of ethnocentricity and that the competi-
tive, novelty seeking behaviour associated with artistic practice in the
West is not universal. This is hard to determine empirically. How-
ever, in that this view of cultural change invites hypothetical pro-
cesses which may have led to the evolution of creative domains, it is
worth considering the possibility that it is a long-standing universal
behaviour.
2 Creativity, Culture and Genetic Evolution
Sosa and Gero [23], focusing on modern design practice, provide
a treatment of creativity situated in social contexts, following the
systems theoretic view proposed by Csikszentmihalyi [8]. The ap-
proach replaces notions of creative individuals with change agents
and locates creativity in situations (combinations of a field, a domain
and a person) rather than solely in individuals. Within this frame-
work Sosa and Gero are able to specify dynamics of social change
that depend only on “group convergence and occasional individual
disagreement” ([23] p.30), thus explicating general processes of cre-
ativity in design. The social dynamics that Sosa and Gero develop
influence the present work, in particular in that creative domains and
creative acts engage in a coevolutionary process, but in this paper I
differ from their focus on design. Whilst, for the purposes of their
design context, Sosa and Gero differentiate between the quality of an
artefact and its ‘creativity’, the former residing “within the internal
charachteristics of a design artefact” ([23] p.31), I consider instead
those contexts in which quality is entirely socially ascribed, which is
epitomised by the domain of music. Furthermore, the focus of this
paper is on the evolutionary principles by which innate human per-
ceptual mechanisms evolved. These mechanisms define boundaries
for creative domains such as music, in the sense that music is primar-
ily a perceptual fact, rather than a physical one. The introduction of
a genetic component to a cultural evolutionary model, to complete a
biocultural coevolutionary view, is also likely to produce very differ-
ent dynamics.
A commonly cited explanation [19] for the existence of musical
behaviour in humans is that it simply brings together sets of cogni-
tive capacities from other domains, such as an aesthetic sense which
derives from the need to find an appropriate habitat, and a desire for
novelty (a capacity for boredom) which serves our creative needs in
more obviously useful domains such as tool-making. Creative do-
mains such as music therefore satisfy what Pinker describes as mal-
adaptive [19]. This view is in keeping with the notion that cultural
evolution is the sole process in the formation of these creative do-
mains, and is amenable to models of social dynamics with no ge-
netic component. However, the increasingly popular notion that cul-
turally constructed contexts feed back into genetic processes of natu-
ral selection (see for example, [13, 17]), has the potential to apply in
this case: socially generated value can ultimately influence individual
success, providing an immediate selection pressure for the evolution
of appropriate aesthetic perceptual mechanisms.
Dissanayake [10], Cross [5, 7, 6] and Mithen [16] all argue for a
biocultural coevolutionary view of music for which the roles of mu-
sic in establishing and maintaining social cohesion, and possibly in
facilitating a certain cognitive flexibility, are both potentially critical
evolutionary driving forces. I do not intend to present an argument
against these well developed theories, but with respect to them the
present work serves specifically to establish whether it is possible to
model the basic process of an evolution of musical behaviour without
these hypothesised driving forces of social cohesion and cognitive
flexibility. In other words I consider whether artistic activities such
as music have emerged simply because of an immediate structural
role in allowing individuals to gain favour with other individuals: this
would allow us to describe them as self-creating and self-maintaining
domains of activity, or autopoietic systems. This is a contentious pro-
posal but not, as it may appear, because it makes a circular argument
out of evolutionary theory. A notion of positive feedback is common
in explanations of evolutionary processes, examples of which include
the evolution of sexually selected traits (typified by the peacock’s tail
feather), the characteristics of predator-prey pairs, and the evolution
of ToM discussed above. The emergence of such creative domains
is proposed as one more such process. The difficulty with the argu-
ment comes more from the poverty of evidence associated with the
evolution of our cultural behaviour, especially in domains that do not
associate themselves clearly with adaptive function. It is further con-
founded by the complexity of cultural behaviour in general.
In such cases broad evolutionary arguments play an important role.
In recent years, niche constructionism [13, 17] has emerged as a the-
oretical framework which places the inheritance of modified environ-
mental conditions on a par with the inheritance of genetic informa-
tion, not only in the very visible activities of humans, but across all of
organic life. From a niche constructionist point of view human cul-
tural activity is suitably ‘potent’ in its niche construction to have had
far reaching implications for subsequent genetic evolution. This per-
spective has the effect of drawing our explanatory focus away from
adaptation-centred arguments [13] due to the effects of basic feed-
back processes. This lightens the necessity to ultimately attribute a
functional role to musical behaviour.
Computational modelling also becomes an increasingly significant
approach in contexts where such broad theoretical notions are at is-
sue. As Di Paolo et al [18] argue, computer simulation models allow
researchers to extend the notion of the thought experiment into situ-
ations which are beyond the capacity to be thought through – situa-
tions that are opaque. In the spirit of Artificial Life, such modelling is
not expected to act as a simulation of the unique sequence of events
that took place (e.g. in human evolutionary history), but as a con-
ceptual tool that allows us to critically consider our theoretical un-
derstanding of possible processes in a way that informs a theoretical
approach to this real evolutionary history. Di Paolo et al propose that
complex simulation models can be iteratively developed through the
formulation of hypotheses from initial exploratory models that im-
plement the researcher’s basic theoretical notions. In [3] I presented
exploratory work aimed at developing a modelling context for bio-
cultural coevolutionary processes, from which the present theoretical
perspective and hypotheses have been extended and developed.
3 Towards a Modelling Context for the Evolution
of Music
Saunders and Gero [20, 21, 22] developed a model of curious be-
haviour and explored the social dynamics that emerge from interac-
tions between curious agents. The basic design of a curious agent is
that it evaluates the novelty of incoming design artefacts with respect
to a set of existing reference points, and this novelty measurement
drives a hedonic response based on a mapping from novelty to value
known as the Wundt Curve [1]. This mapping outputs low value for
both very low and very high levels of novelty, with a single peak
of value for some optimum level of novelty (see inset in figure 1).
Curious agents also generate their own artefacts, based on their own
preferences, which they then share with others.
In order to model the consequences of the social generation of
value for genetic evolutionary processes, the value generated by such
a function after each interaction (i.e., each time one agent evaluates
an artefact produced by another agent) can be awarded to the pro-
ducer of the artefact, contributing to a cumulative fitness score. This
fitness score embodies the notion that, in the context we are mod-
elling, the benefits gained by individuals for creative acts are gener-
ated entirely through social action. Although, in reality, individuals
are aware of their fitness and can adapt their behaviour in response
to it, for simplicity’s sake I consider only the case in which this fit-
ness score influences relative survival and reproduction chances, as
in a genetic algorithm. I do not include any additional notion of fit-
ness with respect to an external (non-social) environment. In this gen-
eral framework the value-generating function needn’t be that used by
Saunders and Gero, although in the following section I will propose
possible interesting consequences of pursuing this model.
Of greatest concern to theorists wishing to model the evolution
of music is how to represent this physically, physiologically and
socially complex activity in a simple computer model, and subse-
quently how to determine what should emerge out of what through-
out the duration of the model. I approach these questions with the
assumption that we can define music in its weakest and most broad
sense as a communicative act that, if nothing else, generates and is
subject to the generation of social value. This is a strong claim and
a deliberate choice of perspective on the evolution of music. This
weak notion of music can be ascribed to any acoustic (or even non-
acoustic) communication between animals in the trivial sense that,
within this modelling framework, the strength of value judgements,
or the importance of status values for survival, can be defined to be
negligible. This may be the default setting for most animal commu-
nication, including that of our hominid ancestors at some point along
our evolutionary history. The important point in setting things up in
this way is that the potential is then there for other features that are
associated with music to emerge.
What, then, are the features that would be interesting to see evolve
within this framework? We can expect to see changes in three ma-
jor domains: in the structure of the patterns (artefacts) being shared;
in the behaviour of individuals (for example in their evaluation
strategies); and in the social organisation and cultural dynamics that
emerge in the whole population (for example in the clustering of indi-
viduals and of the structure of patterns into groups, in the distribution
of fitness within groups and in the cultural dynamics of the system).
4 Hypothetical Processes
Themain result that might convince us that such a model successfully
exhibited a plausible scenario for the evolution of human musical
behaviour would be the emergence of some kind of structure in the
patterns being exchanged. However, since structure emerges in quite
arbitrary complex systems, the designers of such a model may need
to justify exactly in what sense this structure is equivalent to that in
human music.
A recent popular suggestion is that the most significant feature that
sets human musical behaviour apart from animal music-like com-
munication is rhythmic entrainment: the ability to find the beat in
a rhythmic pattern and, perhaps additionally to structure perception
of that pattern according to this beat. Humans are capable of robust
entrainment across a broad range of tempi, unlike other animals who
can at best entrain within a limited tempo range using only phase cor-
rection (Bispham [2] provides a detailed analysis of potential rhyth-
mic behaviours that are specifically human and specifically musical,
centred on this period correcting ability). However, existing mod-
els of rhythmic perception in musical contexts (e.g. [15, 14]) high-
light the fact that there is more happening than just determining a
period. Rhythmic perception also includes the perception of metrical
structures: as listeners we infer beats and a meter on the music that
we listen to and this provides a temporal framework within which
we interpret musical information [4]. Admittedly these more com-
plex aspects may not be innate, or may be insignificant consequences
of the more fundamental evolved mechanism. But whilst basic tim-
ing mechanisms may have evolved under the pressures of social co-
hesion, could structuring aspects of rhythmic perception also have
emerge directly out of the context of the social generation of value?
The first hypothetical process I propose is that an increasing com-
plexity of perceptual mechanisms could be a natural consequence
of the social value framework, assuming the existence of novelty-
seeking behaviour.
This hypothetical process begins by assuming that individuals per-
ceive music by transforming an auditory stimulus into an internal
perceptual space. We also assume that this perceptual space acts as
the metric space in which individuals measure novelty, using the
Wundt Curve, which we assume remains invariant. Finally, we as-
sume that each individual’s perceptual space is partly genetically de-
termined and, in particular, the dimensionality of that space is speci-
fied in the genotype. Then the proposed principle is that, in a situation
where individuals exchange artefacts with equal uniform frequencies
throughout a population, individuals possessing higher-dimensional
perceptual spaces will turn out fitter than those with lower dimen-
sional perceptual spaces. This is because individuals with lower di-
mensional perceptual spaces will reward more artefacts with greater
fitness values, whilst individuals with higher dimensional perceptual
spaces will be more discriminatory.
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Figure 1. Agents with different perceptual spaces
Figure 1 provides an elementary representation of this relation-
ship. A’s perceptual space is two dimensional. A’s position represents
a reference point in that space from which novelty can be measured,
and the dotted circle indicates percepts that generate the highest value
in A’s perceptual space. B’s perceptual space is one dimensional, ex-
isting on the horizontal dotted line. When B produces artefacts that
are optimal as measured in his own perceptual space, they could ap-
pear anywhere in the dimension perpendicular to B’s space, when
perceived by A. But when A produces artefacts that are optimal as
measured in his own perceptual space, they are collapsed onto B’s
single dimension. Thus in many cases A will be more likely to pro-
duce artefacts that B values, but not vice versa.
It does not immediately follow that perceptual spaces will increase
in dimension over evolutionary time. Implementing novelty-seeking
behaviour implies that individual artefacts will be constantly chang-
ing within generations. Thus the proposed feedback necessarily relies
on a dynamic cultural process rather than on a static cultural state,
and only in simulation will it be really clear how the cultural process
and genetic state will interact.
Continuing this discussion it becomes clearer that the questions of
what music actually is and how it evolved are actually closely related.
The proposal that rhythmic entrainment is crucial to the evolution of
human musical behaviour implies that temporal structuring is crucial
in the definition of human music, and vice versa.
Given the assumption that by its weakest definition music is a
mode of communication that results in the generation of value, what
positive results could we expect a model to produce with respect to
the other emergent possibilities in the model: individual behavioural
strategies and social and cultural organisation? If the relationship be-
tween novelty and value were also to become a genetically deter-
mined variable of a model, could the particular relationship defined
by the Wundt Curve emerge and/or sustain itself throughout the evo-
lution of the model, through its interaction with other aspects of the
model?
Novelty-value relationships have the potential to reinforce social
structural organisations by, in the case of the Wundt Curve, promot-
ing loose local cohesion and global separation. But, equally, consis-
tent social structures may also influence the emergence of specific
novelty value relations over genetic evolutionary time by creating a
context in which it is beneficial to have such patterns of behaviour.
This provokes a second extremely tentative hypothetical process in
which social structures and innate novelty-value mappings coevolve
into a mutually reinforcing stable state.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have proposed a model associated with the evolution
of musical behaviour in humans, based on the social generation of
value, which I argue is increasingly relevant to human genetic evo-
lution in light of the theory of niche construction. Like any artificial
social system it is a weak representation of the real process it aims
to investigate. However, its aim is to throw up hypothetical processes
that can be investigated in greater detail because they can be imple-
mented and tested as a computer simulation. The two hypothetical
processes considered in this paper are; that complexity of percep-
tual systems emerges from the interaction of novelty seeking agents
in systems of socially generated value, and that novelty-seeking be-
haviour and the clustering of cultural styles potentially mutually rein-
force each other in such systems. This work is of little practical value
in the creation of artificial creative systems but extends the theory of
coevolving systems of production and evaluation to incorporate pro-
cesses of human genetic evolution that are ultimately important in
the understanding of human creativity.
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